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Abstract
We present adversarial attacks and defenses for the perceptual adversarial threat
model: the set of all perturbations to natural images which can mislead a classifier
but are imperceptible to human eyes. The perceptual threat model is broad and
encompasses L2, L∞, spatial, and many other existing adversarial threat models.
However, it is difficult to determine if an arbitrary perturbation is imperceptible
without humans in the loop. To solve this issue, we propose to use a neural
perceptual distance, an approximation of the true perceptual distance between
images using internal activations of neural networks. In particular, we use the
Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS) distance. We then propose
the neural perceptual threat model that includes adversarial examples with a
bounded neural perceptual distance to natural images. Under the neural perceptual
threat model, we develop two novel perceptual adversarial attacks to find any
imperceptible perturbations to images which can fool a classifier. Through an
extensive perceptual study, we show that the LPIPS distance correlates well with
human judgements of perceptibility of adversarial examples, validating our threat
model. Because the LPIPS threat model is very broad, we find that Perceptual
Adversarial Training (PAT) against a perceptual attack gives robustness against
many other types of adversarial attacks. We test PAT on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-
100 against 12 types of adversarial attacks and find that, for each attack, PAT
achieves close to the accuracy of adversarial training against just that perturbation
type. That is, PAT generalizes well to unforeseen perturbation types. This is vital
in sensitive applications where a particular threat model cannot be assumed, and to
the best of our knowledge, PAT is the first adversarial defense with this property.
1 Introduction
Many modern machine learning algorithms are susceptible to adversarial examples: carefully crafted
inputs designed to fool models into giving incorrect outputs [1, 2, 3, 4]. For instance, an imperceptible
change to each pixel in an image of a dog could cause a classifier to predict its label as cat. Adversarial
examples are serious concerns in safety-critical applications of machine learning, such as self-driving
cars. Thus, much research has focused on increasing classifiers’ robustness against adversarial attacks
[5, 6, 7].
Existing adversarial defenses for image classifiers generally consider simple threat models. An
adversarial threat model defines a set of perturbations that may be made to an image in order to
produce an adversarial example. Common threat models include the L2 and L∞ threat models, which
constrain adversarial examples to be close to the original image inL2 orL∞ distances. Some work has
proposed additional threat models which allow spatial perturbations [8, 9, 10], recoloring [11, 12, 13],
and other modifications [14, 15] of an image.
There are multiple issues with these unrealistically constrained adversarial threat models. First,
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Figure 1: Relationships between various adver-
sarial threat models. Lp and spatial adversar-
ial attacks are contained within the perceptual
threat model, while patch attacks may be percep-
tible and thus are not entirely contained. In this
paper, we propose the neural perceptual threat
model that is based on an approximation of the
true perceptual distance using neural networks.
In particular, we use the LPIPS distance [22] in
our attack and defense methods.
hardening against one threat model assumes that an adversary will only attempt attacks within that
threat model. Although a classifier may be trained to be robust against L∞ attacks, for instance,
an attacker could easily generate a spatial attack to fool the classifier. One possible solution is to
train against multiple threat models simultaneously [16, 12, 17]. However, this generally results in
a lower robustness against any one of the threat models when compared to hardening against that
threat model alone. Furthermore, not all possible threat models may be known at the training time,
and adversarial defenses do not usually generalize well to unforeseen threat models [18].
The ideal solution to these drawbacks would be a defense that is robust against a wide, unconstrained
threat model. We differentiate between two such threat models. The unrestricted adversarial threat
model [19] encompasses any adversarial example that is labeled as one class by a classifier but a
different class by humans. On the other hand, we define the perceptual adversarial threat model as
including all perturbations of natural images such that the perturbations are imperceptible to a human.
Most existing narrow threat models such as L2, L∞, etc. are subsets of the perceptual threat model
(Figure 1). Some other threat models, such as adversarial patch attacks [20], may include perceptible
changes without changing the true class of an image and as such are contained in the unrestricted
adversarial threat model. In this work, we focus on the perceptual threat model.
The perceptual threat model can be formalized given the true perceptual distance d∗(x1,x2) between
images x1 and x2, defined as how different two images appear to humans. For some threshold ∗,
which we call the perceptibility threshold, images x and x′ are indistinguishable from one another as
long as d∗(x,x′) ≤ ∗. Note that in general ∗ may depend on the specific input. Then, the perceptual
threat model for a natural input x includes all adversarial examples x˜ which cause misclassification
but are imperceptibly different from x, i.e. d∗(x, x˜) ≤ ∗.
The true perceptual distance d∗(·, ·), however, cannot be easily computed or optimized against.
To solve this issue, we propose to use a neural perceptual distance, an approximation of the true
perceptual distance between images using neural networks. Fortunately, there have been many
surrogate perceptual distances proposed in the computer vision literature such as SSIM [21]. Recently,
Zhang et al. [22] discovered that comparing the internal activations of a convolutional neural network
when two different images are passed through provides a measure, LPIPS, that correlates well with
human perception. We propose to use the LPIPS distance d(·, ·) in place of the true perceptual
distance d∗(·, ·) to formalize the neural perceptual threat model.
We present adversarial attacks and defenses for the neural (LPIPS) perceptual threat model. Gener-
ating adversarial examples bounded by the LPIPS distance is difficult compared to generating Lp
adversarial examples because of the complexity and non-convexness of the constraint. However,
we solve a simplified case with a linear approximation of the classification network and a quadratic
approximation of the LPIPS distance using the conjugate gradient method. Repeatedly applying this
step yields an iterative attack called Perceptual Projected Gradient Descent (PPGD). We also form a
Lagrangian relaxation of the constrained optimization problem of finding a perceptual adversarial
example; this leads to an attack, Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA), similar to that of Carlini and
Wagner [23]. In addition to these attacks, which are suitable for evaluation of a classifier against the
perceptual threat model, we also develop Fast-LPA, a more efficient version of LPA that we use in
Perceptual Adversarial Training (PAT).
Remarkably, using PAT to train a neural network classifier produces a single model with close to
state-of-the-art robustness against a variety of imperceptible perturbations, including L∞, L2, L1,
spatial, recoloring, and JPEG attacks on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-100 (a subset of ImageNet) (Tables
2
2 and 3). For example, PAT achieves 68% and 73% accuracies against spatial [10] and recoloring
[12] attacks, respectively, while threat-specific adversarial training (AT) [6] methods achieve 76%
and 81% accuracies. In contrast, AT against L2 achieves only 15% and 60% accuracies against these
attacks, respectively. PAT also leads to high Unforeseen Attack Robustness (UAR) [18], a measure of
how well an adversarial defense generalizes to threat models that it was not trained against.
Does the LPIPS distance accurately reflect human perception when it is used to evaluate adversarial
examples? We performed a study on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to determine how perceptible
14 different types of adversarial perturbations such as L∞, L2, spatial, and recoloring attacks are at
multiple threat-specific bounds. We find that LPIPS correlates well with human judgements across
different adversarial perturbation types we examine. This indicates that our LPIPS-based threat model
closely matches the true perceptual threat model and reinforces the utility of our perceptual attacks to
measure adversarial robustness against an expansive threat model. Furthermore, this study allows
calibration of a variety of attack bounds to a single perceptibility metric. We will release our dataset
of adversarial examples along with the annotations made by participants for further study.
2 Related Work
Adversarial robustness Adversarial robustness has been studied extensively for L2 or L∞ threat
models [5, 23, 6] and non-Lp threat models such as spatial perturbations [8, 10, 9], recoloring of an
image [11, 12, 13], and perturbations in the frequency domain (JPEG attacks) [18]. The most popular
known adversarial defense for these threat models is adversarial training [24, 25, 26] where a neural
network is trained to minimize the worst-case loss in a region around the input. Recent evaluation
methodologies such as Unforeseen Attack Robustness (UAR) [18] and the Unrestricted Adversarial
Examples challenge [19] have raised the problem of finding an adversarial defense which gives good
robustness under more general threat models. Sharif et al. [27] conduct a perceptual study showing
that Lp threat models are a poor approximation of the perceptual threat model. Dunn et al. [28] and
Xu et al. [29] have developed adversarial attacks that manipulate higher-level, semantic features.
Jordan et al. [16] first explored quantifying adversarial distortions with LPIPS distance.
Perceptual similarity Two basic similarity measures for images are the L2 distance and the Peak
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR). However, these similarity measures disagree with human vision on
many types of perturbations such as blurring and spatial transformations, which has motivated others
such as SSIM [21], MS-SSIM [30], CW-SSIM [31], HDR-VDP-2 [32] and LPIPS [22].
3 Neural Perceptual Threat Model
Since the true perceptual distance between images cannot be efficiently computed, we use approxi-
mations of it using neural networks, i.e. neural perceptual distances. In this paper, we focus on the
LPIPS distance [22] while we note that other neural perceptual distances can also be used in our
attacks and defenses.
Let g : X → Y be a convolutional image classifier network defined on images x ∈ X . Let g have L
layers, and let the internal activations (outputs) of the l-th layer of g(x) for an input x be denoted
as gl(x). Zhang et al. [22] have found that normalizing and then comparing the internal activations
of convolutional neural networks correlates well with human similarity judgements. Thus, the first
step in calculating the LPIPS distance using the network g(·) is to normalize the internal activations
across the channel dimension such that the L2 norm over channels at each pixel is one. Let gˆl(x)
denote these channel-normalized activations at the l-th layer of the network. Next, the activations are
normalized again by layer size and flattened into a single vector φ(x), defined as:
φ(x) ,
(
gˆ1(x)√
w1h1
, . . . ,
gˆL(x)√
wLhL
)
,
where wl and hl are the width and height of the activations in layer l, respectively. The function
φ : X → A thus maps the inputs x ∈ X of the classifier g(·) to the resulting normalized, flattened
internal activations φ(x) ∈ A, where A ⊆ Rm refers to the space of all possible resulting activations.
The LPIPS distance d(x1,x2) between images x1 and x2 is then defined as:
d(x1,x2) , ‖φ(x1)− φ(x2)‖2 . (1)
Now let f : X → Y be a classifier which maps inputs x ∈ X to labels f(x) ∈ Y . f(·) could be the
3
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Figure 2: Adversarial examples generated using self-bounded and externally-bounded PPGD and
LPA perceptual adversarial attacks (Section 4) with a large bound. Original images are shown in the
left column and magnified differences from the original are shown to the right of the examples.
same as g(·), or it could be a different network; we experiment with both. For a given natural input x
with the true label y, a neural (LPIPS) perceptual adversarial example with a perceptibility bound  is
an input x˜ ∈ X such that two conditions hold:
f(x˜) 6= y and d(x, x˜) = ‖φ(x)− φ(x˜)‖2 ≤ . (2)
That is, x˜ must be perceptually similar to x but cause f to misclassify.
4 Perceptual Adversarial Attacks
We propose attack methods which attempt to find an adversarial example with small perceptual
distortion. Developing adversarial attacks that utilize the proposed neural perceptual threat model
is more difficult than that of standard Lp threat models, because the LPIPS distance constraint is
more complex than Lp constraints. In general, we find an adversarial example that satisfies (2) by
maximizing a loss function L within the LPIPS bound. The loss function we use is similar to the
margin loss from Carlini and Wagner [23], defined as
L(f(x), y) , min
(
κ,
(
max
i6=y
zi(x)
)− zy(x)),
where zi(x) is the i-th logit output of the classifier f(·). κ ≥ 0 defines the “confidence” of the
misclassification; we use κ = 1. This gives the constrained optimization problem
max
x˜
L(f(x˜), y) subject to d(x, x˜) = ‖φ(x)− φ(x˜)‖2 ≤ . (3)
Note that in this attack problem, the classifier network f(·) and the LPIPS network g(·) are fixed.
These two networks could be identical, in which case the same network that is being attacked is
used to calculate the LPIPS distance that bounds the attack; we call this a self-bounded attack. If a
different network is used to calculate the LPIPS bound, we call it an externally-bounded attack.
Based on this formulation, we propose two perceptual attack methods, Perceptual Projected Gradient
Descent (PPGD) and Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA). See Figure 2 for sample results.
Perceptual Projected Gradient Descent (PPGD) The first of our two attacks is analogous to
the PGD [6] or FGSMk [5] attacks used for Lp threat models. In general, these attacks consist
of iteratively performing two steps on the current adversarial example candidate: (a) taking a
step of a certain size under the given distance that maximizes a first-order approximation of the
misclassification loss, and (b) projecting back onto the feasible set of the threat model.
Identifying the ideal first-order step is easy in L2 and L∞ threat models; it is the gradient of
the loss function and the sign of the gradient, respectively. However, computing this step is not
straightforward with the LPIPS distance, because the distance metric itself is defined by a neural
network. Following (3), we desire to find a step δ to maximize L(f(x+δ), y) such that d(x+δ,x) =
4
‖φ(x+ δ)− φ(x)‖2 ≤ η, where η is the step size. Let fˆ(x) := L(f(x), y) for an input x ∈ X . Let
J be the Jacobian of φ(·) at x and ∇fˆ be the gradient of fˆ(·) at x. Then, we can approximate (3)
using a first-order Taylor’s approximation of φ and fˆ as follows:
max
δ
fˆ(x) + (∇fˆ)>δ subject to ‖Jδ‖2 ≤ η. (4)
We show that this constrained optimization can be solved in a closed form:
Lemma 1. Let J+ denote the pseudoinverse of J . Then the solution to (4) is given by
δ∗ = η
(J>J)−1(∇fˆ)
‖(J+)>(∇fˆ)‖2
.
See Appendix A.1 for the proof. This solution is still difficult to efficiently compute, since calculating
J+ and inverting J>J are computationally expensive. Thus, we approximately solve for δ∗ using
the conjugate gradient method; see Appendix A.1 for details.
Perceptual PGD consists of repeatedly finding first-order optimal δ∗ to add to the current adversarial
example x˜ for a number of steps. Following each step, if the current adversarial example x˜ is outside
the LPIPS bound, we project x˜ back onto the threat model such that d(x˜,x) ≤ . The exact projection
is again difficult due to the non-convexity of the feasible set. Thus, we use an approximate projection
as follows: Let δ = x˜−x. We use the bisection root finding method (see Algorithm 4 in the appendix)
to find α ∈ [0, 1] such that d(x+ αδ,x)−  = 0. Then, we project x˜ to x+ αδ.
Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA) The second of our two attacks uses a Lagrangian relaxation
of the attack problem (3) similar to that used by Carlini and Wagner [23] for constructing L2 and
L∞ adversarial examples. We call this attack the Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA) because we
perform a search for the optimal Lagrangian weight λ to apply to the constraint. To derive the attack,
we use the following Lagrangian relaxation of (3):
max
x˜
L(f(x˜), y)− λmax
(
0, ‖φ(x˜)− φ(x)‖2 − 
)
. (5)
The perceptual constraint cost, multiplied by λ in (5), is designed to be 0 as long as the adversarial
example is within the allowed perceptual distance; i.e. d(x˜,x) ≤ ; once d(x˜,x) > , however, it
increases linearly by the LPIPS distance from the original input x.
Similar to Lp attacks of Carlini and Wagner [23], we adaptively change λ to find an adversarial
example within the allowed perceptual distance. In particular, we start with a small value of λ (i.e.
λ = 10−2) and optimize (5) using a variant of gradient descent with decreasing step size η. After this
step, if d(x, x˜) > , we increase λ by a factor of 10 and repeat the optimization. We repeat this for
up to 5 iterations. Finally, we project the resulting adversarial example x˜ into the threat model using
the same algorithm used in PPGD (see Appendix A.2 for details).
5 Perceptual Adversarial Training
LPIPS attacks can be used to harden a classifier against the perceptual threat model. The intuition,
which we verify in Section 7, is that if a model is robust against LPIPS attacks, it can demonstrate
an enhanced robustness against other types of unforeseen adversarial attacks such as StAdv [10] or
ReColorAdv [12]. Inspired by adversarial training used to robustify models against Lp attacks, we
propose a method called Perceptual Adversarial Training (PAT). PAT utilizes perceptual adversarial
attacks to increase the classifier’s robustness against not only LPIPS-specific attacks, but also a wide
range of other threat models.
Suppose we wish to train a classifier f(·) over a distribution of inputs and labels (x, y) ∼ D such that
it is robust to the perceptual threat model with bound . Let Lce denote the cross entropy (negative
log likelihood) loss and suppose the classifier f(·) is parameterized by θf . Then, PAT consists of
optimizing f(·) in a manner analogous to Lp adversarial training [6]:
min
θf
E
(x,y)∼D
[
max
d(x˜,x)≤
Lce(f(x˜), y)
]
. (6)
The training formulation attempts to minimize the worst-case loss within a neighborhood of each
training point x. In PAT, the neighborhood is bounded by the LPIPS distance. Recall that the LPIPS
distance is itself defined based on a particular neural network classifier. We refer to the normalized,
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Table 1: Correlation between the perceptibility of attacks and various distance measures: L2,
SSIM [21], and LPIPS [22] calculated using various architectures [34, 35, 36] trained normally and
with adversarial training (AT).
Arch. L2 SSIM AlexNet VGG-16 ResNet-50
Training Normal Normal Normal AT L∞ AT L2 PAT PAT-AlexNet
Correl. (r) 0.58 0.68 0.85 0.81 0.84 0.70 0.66 0.62 0.61
flattened activations of the network used to define LPIPS as φ(·) and θφ to refer to its parameters.
We explore two variants of PAT differentiated by the choice of the network used to define φ(·). In
externally-bounded PAT, a separate, pretrained network is used to calculate φ(·) the LPIPS distance
d(·, ·). In self-bounded PAT, the same network which is being trained for classification is used to
calculate the LPIPS distance, i.e. θφ ⊆ θf . Note that in self-bounded PAT the definition of the LPIPS
distance changes during the training as the classifier is optimized.
The inner maximization in (6) is intractable to compute exactly. However, we can use the perceptual
attacks developed in Section 4 to approximately solve it. Since the inner maximization must be solved
repeatedly during the training process, we use a variant of the LPA attack called Fast-LPA. Fast-LPA
is inexpensive compared to LPA because it does not search for an ideal λ value; see Appendix A.3
and Algorithm 3 for details. The resulting adversarial examples are given to the classifier f(·) and its
parameters are updated by stochastic gradient descent (SGD):
min
θf
E
(x,y)∼D
[
Lce
(
f
(
FASTLPA(f, d,x, y, )
)
, y
)]
.
Training a classifier with PAT gives robustness against a wide range of adversarial threat models (see
Section 7). However, it tends to give low accuracy against natural, unperturbed inputs. Thus, we use a
technique from Balaji et al. [33] to improve natural accuracy in PAT-trained models: at each training
step, only inputs which are classified correctly without any perturbation are attacked. In addition to
increasing natural accuracy, this also improves the speed of PAT since only some inputs from each
batch must be attacked.
6 Perceptual Evaluation
We conduct a thorough perceptual evaluation of our LPIPS-based threat model and attacks to ensure
that the resulting adversarial examples are imperceptible. We also compare the perceptibility of LPIPS-
based attacks to 12 narrow threat models: spatially transformed adversarial examples (StAdv) [10],
functional adversarial attacks (ReColorAdv) [12], and the 10 UAR attacks [18], which include L∞,
L2, JPEG (frequency domain), and other threat models. The comparison allows us to determine if
the LPIPS distance is a good surrogate for human comparisons of similarity. It also allows us to set
bounds across threat models with approximately the same level of perceptibility.
To determine how perceptible a particular threat model is at a particular bound (e.g. L∞ attacks at
 = 8/255), we follow a procedure from Xiao et al. [10]. We show pairs of images to participants
on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), an online crowdsourcing platform. In each pair, one image
is a natural image from ImageNet-100 and one image is an adversarial perturbation of the natural
image, generated using the particular attack against a classifier hardened to that attack. The images
are shown for 2 seconds, after which the participant must choose which image they believe is the
original, unmodified one. We report the proportion of pairs for which participants are correct as
the perceptibility of the attack. For a completely imperceptible attack, perceptibility is 50%, since
participants must guess at each pair randomly; for a completely perceptible attack, perceptibility is
100%, since participants will always know which image is natural.
We collect about 1,000 annotations of image pairs for each of 3 bounds for all 12 threat models,
plus our PPGD and LPA attacks (37k annotations total for 7.4k image pairs). The three bounds
for each attack are labeled as small, medium, and large; bounds with the same label have similar
perceptibility across threat models (see Appendix C Table 4). We will make the dataset of image
pairs and associated annotations available for use by the community.
To determine if the LPIPS threat model is a good surrogate for the perceptual threat model, we use
various classifiers to calculate the LPIPS distance d(·, ·) between the pairs of images used in the
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Figure 3: Results of the perceptual study described in Section 6 across twelve narrow threat models
and our two perceptual attacks, each with three bounds. (a) The perceptibility of adversarial examples
correlates well with the LPIPS distance (based on AlexNet) from the natural example. (b) The
Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA) is strongest at a given perceptibility, followed by L2, Perceptual
PGD (PPGD), and L∞. Strength is the randomly targeted attack success rate against an adversarially
trained classifier.
perceptual study. For each classifier, we determine the correlation between the mean LPIPS distance
it assigns to image pairs from each attack and the perceptibility of that attack (Table 1). We find that
AlexNet [35], trained normally on ImageNet [37], correlates best with human perception of these
adversarial examples (r = 0.84); this agrees with Zhang et al. [22] who also find that AlexNet-based
LPIPS correlates best with human perception (Figure 3). Because AlexNet is the best proxy for
human judgements of perceptual distance, we use it for all externally-bounded evaluation attacks.
We also use the results of the perceptual study to investigate which attacks are strongest at a particular
level of perceptibility. We evaluate each attack on a classifier hardened against that attack via
adversarial training, and plot the resulting success rate against the proportion of correct annotations
from the perceptual study. Out of the narrow threat models, we find that L2 attacks are the strongest
for their perceptibility. However, the Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA) reduces a PAT-trained
classifier to even lower accuracies (0.6% at the high bound), making it the strongest attack studied.
7 Experiments
We compare Perceptual Adversarial Training (PAT) to adversarial training against narrow threat
models (Lp, spatial, etc.) on CIFAR-10 [38] and ImageNet-100 (the subset of ImageNet [37]
containing every tenth class by WordNet ID order). We find that PAT results in classifiers with
robustness against a broad range of narrow threat models. We also show that our perceptual attacks,
PPGD and LPA, are strong against adversarial training with narrow threat models. We evaluate
with externally-bounded PPGD and LPA (Section 4), using AlexNet to determine the LPIPS bound
because it correlates best with human judgements (Table 1).
CIFAR-10 We test ResNet-50s trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset with PAT and adversarial training
against six attacks (see Table 2): L∞ and L2 PGD [6], StAdv [10], ReColorAdv [12], and PPGD and
LPA. This allows us to determine if PAT gives robustness against a range of adversarial attacks. We
experiment with using various models to calculate the LPIPS distance during training. We try using
the same model both for classification and to calculate the LPIPS distance (self-bounded PAT). We
also use models pretrained normally or adversarially on CIFAR-10 prior to PAT (externally-bounded
PAT) including AlexNet and ResNet-50. We find that PAT outperforms Lp adversarial training,
particularly against the StAdv attack. Ablation studies of PAT are presented in Appendix E.
ImageNet-100 We compare the best-performing PAT variants, self-bounded and externally-
bounded with AlexNet, to adversarial training against narrow threat models on ImageNet-100.
Each resulting classifier is tested against twelve attacks at the large bound from the perceptual study
(see Section 6 and Appendix Table 4). We use randomly-targeted attacks1 to match Kang et al. [18].
1Random targets are chosen for each input from all incorrect classes; an attack succeeds only if it perturbs
the input such that the classifier outputs the target class. This is to maintain consistency with Kang et al. [18],
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Table 2: Accuracies against various attacks for models trained with adversarial training and Perceptual
Adversarial Training (PAT) variants on CIFAR-10. Attack bounds are 8/255 for L∞, 1 for L2, 0.5
for PPGD/LPA (bounded with AlexNet), and the original bounds for StAdv/ReColorAdv. All attacks
are untargeted.
Attack
Training LPIPS model None L∞ L2 StAdv ReColorAdv PPGD LPA
Normal 95.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0
AT L∞ 87.0 52.4 25.1 6.3 59.7 6.4 0.2
AT L2 81.6 45.3 51.8 14.9 60.5 27.6 3.0
AT StAdv 83.9 0.3 0.8 76.1 13.9 0.1 0.0
AT ReColorAdv 92.0 15.5 10.5 0.3 81.2 1.8 0.0
PAT self-bounded 81.9 42.3 47.2 51.7 75.4 26.5 5.8
PAT AlexNet 85.9 41.5 46.5 15.4 64.0 31.8 3.3
PAT ResNet-50 88.7 38.4 43.9 7.7 62.7 26.2 1.9
PAT ResNet-50 (AT L2) 75.8 52.0 58.1 68.3 73.2 32.9 8.7
Table 3: Comparison of adversarial training against narrow threat models and Perceptual Adversarial
Training (PAT) on ImageNet-100. Accuracies are shown against twelve attacks with the large bounds
from Table 4. All attacks are randomly targeted.1 Gabor and Fog attacks are excluded because they
have low success rates. Note that PAT gives high accuracy across diverse threat models.
Attack
Training No L∞ L2 L1 J∞ J2 J1 Snow Elst St RC PPGD LPA
Normal 86.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.3 0.2 0.0 9.4 0.3 0.1
L∞ 78.5 63.9 9.0 32.9 18.5 8.6 2.9 76.6 33.0 5.2 40.4 18.7 0.3
L2 75.0 60.5 54.4 72.9 68.2 64.4 36.2 73.6 42.4 16.7 37.3 40.6 0.4
L1 83.5 1.1 0.4 75.7 5.2 5.7 2.9 75.3 6.1 1.0 19.5 0.8 0.1
JPEG-L∞ 83.9 2.2 0.1 19.4 79.0 75.4 47.0 72.1 2.7 0.4 28.9 0.7 0.0
JPEG-L2 83.6 2.1 0.2 28.6 77.4 78.1 58.7 74.1 2.7 0.5 29.4 1.8 0.1
JPEG-L1 82.6 5.3 0.9 45.3 78.1 79.4 71.9 76.2 6.4 0.9 32.3 1.8 0.1
Snow 83.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 81.4 1.9 0.1 10.7 0.1 0.0
Elastic 83.7 0.1 0.0 12.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 77.7 76.6 2.4 12.1 0.2 0.2
StAdv 77.1 2.7 1.1 55.1 8.2 5.7 13.6 76.0 75.2 73.7 13.2 2.0 0.2
ReColorAdv 90.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 83.4 1.1 0.1 74.3 0.1 0.2
PAT-self 72.8 59.5 51.4 70.7 63.6 58.6 40.9 71.5 50.5 43.2 51.6 55.7 2.0
PAT-AlexNet 78.1 63.1 51.8 75.4 68.6 62.1 39.1 76.9 47.1 23.9 47.7 53.3 0.6
The results are shown in Table 3. Both self- and externally-bounded PAT give similar results, and
both produce robustness comparable to that of adversarial training across all attacks investigated.
PAT is particularly impressive against the StAdv and ReColorAdv attacks, with accuracies over 10%
higher than the next best model not trained against the specific attack.
Perceptual attacks On both CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-100, we find that Perceptual PGD (PPGD)
and Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA) are among the strongest attacks studied. LPA is the strongest,
reducing the most robust classifier to 8.7% accuracy on CIFAR-10 and 2.0% accuracy on ImageNet-
100. Furthermore, models most robust to LPA in both cases are those that have the best robustness
across many narrow threat models. This demonstrates the utility of evaluating against LPA as a proxy
for adversarial robustness against a range of threat models. See Appendix D for more experiments
we have performed using variations of PPGD and LPA.
since we compare to their pretrained models. See Appendix F.1 for details.
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8 Conclusion
We have presented attacks and defenses for the neural perceptual threat model (realized by the
LPIPS distance) and shown that it closely approximates the true perceptual threat model, the set of
all perturbations to natural inputs which fool a model but are imperceptible to humans. Our LPA
attack is the strongest adversarial attack investigated, even in the presence of defenses. The proposed
Perceptual Adversarial Training (PAT) improves robustness against a broad range of unseen attacks.
While we have focused on image classifiers in this work, our approach is general and may be applied
to other deep learning algorithms in which internal activations can be used to calculate similarity
measures between inputs. Our proposed perceptual adversarial attacks and PAT could be extended to
other vision algorithms, or even other domains such as audio and text.
Broader Impact
Perceptual adversarial training (PAT) could be used to robustify different computer vision systems,
or even deep learning algorithms in other domains such as audio and text. Our perceptual attacks
can be used to evaluate the adversarial robustness of trained computer vision algorithms against a
wide threat model. However, we do not rule out that there may be stronger attacks within the true
perceptual threat model. Thus, evaluation against our perceptual attacks may provide a false sense of
security, and may need to be used as a necessary but not sufficient guarantor of robustness.
Adversarial robustness may be important for safety- or security-critical applications of deep learning,
such as self-driving cars. Some work has shown successful adversarial attacks against object
detectors [39] like those used in self-driving cars, which could fool the cars into taking unsafe
actions. PAT may be used to improve the robustness of algorithms in these safety-critical applications,
mitigating some of the risks. On the other hand, the attacks we describe, PPGD and LPA, are stronger
than most existing attacks because they use a more expansive threat model. Thus, they could be used
by attackers to fool security-critical machine learning systems into taking harmful actions.
This raises issues similar to those in the computer security research community; they debate the
merits of full disclosure—making vulnerabilities public as soon as possible—versus responsible
disclosure—giving time for the vulnerability to be patched before publication [40]. Responsible
disclosure seems more difficult for adversarial attacks, since vulnerabilities may be widespread (not
confined to a single piece of software) and vary greatly across applications.
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Appendix
A Perceptual Attack Algorithms
A.1 Perceptual PGD
Recall from Section 4 that Perceptual PGD (PPGD) consists of repeatedly applying two steps: a
first-order step in LPIPS distance to maximize the loss, followed by a projection into the allowed set
of inputs. Here, we focus on the first-order step; see Appendix A.4 for how we perform projection
onto the LPIPS ball.
We wish to solve the following constrained optimization for the step δ given the step size η and
current input x:
max
δ
L(f(x+ δ), y) subject to ‖Jδ‖2 ≤ η (7)
Let fˆ(x) := L(f(x), y) for an input x ∈ X . Let J be the Jacobian of φ(·) at x and ∇fˆ be the
gradient of fˆ(·) at x.
Lemma 1. The first-order approximation of (7) is
max
δ
fˆ(x) + (∇fˆ)>δ subject to ‖Jδ‖2 ≤ η, (8)
and can be solved in closed-form by
δ∗ = η
(J>J)−1(∇fˆ)
‖(J+)>(∇fˆ)‖2
.
where J+ is the pseudoinverse of J .
Proof. We solve (8) using Lagrange multipliers. First, we take the gradient of the objective:
∇δ
[
fˆ(x) + (∇fˆ)>δ
]
= ∇fˆ
We can rewrite the constraint by squaring both sides to obtain
δ>J>Jδ − 2 ≤ 0
Taking the gradient of the constraint gives
∇δ
[
δ>J>Jδ − 2] = 2J>Jδ
Now, we set one gradient as a multiple of the other and solve for δ:
J>Jδ = λ(∇fˆ) (9)
δ = λ(J>J)−1(∇fˆ) (10)
Substituting into the constraint from (8) gives
‖Jδ‖2 = η
‖Jλ(J>J)−1(∇fˆ)‖2 = η
λ‖J(J>J)−1(∇fˆ)‖2 = η
λ‖((J>J)−1J>)>(∇fˆ)‖2 = η
λ‖(J+)>(∇fˆ)‖2 = η
λ =
η
‖(J+)>(∇fˆ)‖2
We substitute this value of λ into (10) to obtain
δ∗ = η
(J>J)−1(∇fˆ)
‖(J+)>(∇fˆ)‖2
. (11)

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Figure 4: Creating an adversarial example in the LPIPS threat model.
Solution with conjugate gradient method Calculating (11) directly is computationally intractable
for most neural networks, since inverting J>J and calculating the pseudoinverse of J are expensive.
Instead, we approximate δ∗ by using the conjugate gradient method to solve the following linear
system, based on (9):
J>Jδ = ∇fˆ (12)
∇fˆ is easy to calculate using backpropagation. The conjugate gradient method does not require
calculating fully J>J ; instead, it only requires the ability to perform matrix-vector products J>Jv
for various vectors v.
We can approximate Jv using finite differences given a small, positive value h:
Jv ≈ φ(x+ hv)− φ(x)
h
Then, we can calculate J>Jv by introducing an additional variable u and using autograd:
∇u
[
(φ(x+ u))
>
Jv
]
u=0
=
[(
dφ
du
(x+ u)
)>
Jv + (φ(x+ u))
> d
du
Jv
]
u=0
=
[(
dφ
du
(x+ u)
)>
Jv + (φ(x+ u))
> 0
]
u=0
=
(
dφ
du
(x)
)>
Jv = J>Jv
This allows us to efficiently approximate the solution of (12) to obtain (J>J)−1∇fˆ . We use 5
iterations of the conjugate gradient algorithm in practice.
From there, it easy to solve for λ, given that (J+)>∇fˆ = J(J>J)−1∇fˆ . Then, δ∗ can be calculated
via (10). See Algorithm 1 for the full attack.
Computational complexity PPGD’s running time scales with the number of steps T and the
number of conjugate gradient iterations K. It also depends on whether the attack is self-bounded
(the same network is used for classification and the LPIPS distance) or externally-bounded (different
networks are used).
For each of the T steps, θ(x˜),∇x˜L(f(x˜), y), and φ(x˜+ hδk) must be calculated once (lines 4 and
15 in Algorithm 1). This takes 2 forward passes and 1 backward pass for the self-bounded case, and 3
forward passes and 1 backward pass for the externally-bounded case.
In addition, J>Jv needs to be calculated (in the MULTIPLYJACOBIAN routine) K + 1 times. Each
calculation of J>Jv requires 1 forward and 1 backward pass, assuming φ(x˜) is already calculated.
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Finally, the projection step takes n+ 1 forward passes for n iterations of the bisection method (see
Section A.4).
In all, the algorithm requires T (K + n+ 4) forward passes and T (K + n+ 3) backward passes in
the self-bounded case. In the externally-bounded case, it requires T (K + n+ 5) forward passes and
the same number of backward passes.
Algorithm 1 Perceptual PGD (PPGD)
1: procedure PPGD(classifier f(·), LPIPS network φ(·), input x, label y, bound , step η)
2: x˜← x+ 0.01 ∗ N (0, 1) . initialize perturbations with random Gaussian noise
3: for t in 1, . . . , T do . T is the number of steps
4: ∇fˆ ← ∇x˜L(f(x˜), y)
5: δ0 ← 0
6: r0 ← ∇fˆ −MULTIPLYJACOBIAN(φ, x˜, δ0)
7: p0 ← r0
8: for k in 0, . . . ,K − 1 do . conjugate gradient algorithm; we use K = 5 iterations
9: αk ← r
>
k rk
p>k MULTIPLYJACOBIAN(φ,x˜,pk)
10: δk+1 ← δk + αkpk
11: rk+1 ← rk − αkMULTIPLYJACOBIAN(φ, x˜, pk)
12: βk ← r
>
k+1rk+1
r>k rk
13: pk+1 ← rk+1 + βkpk
14: end for
15: m← ‖φ(x˜+ hδk)− φ(x˜)‖/h . m ≈ ‖Jδk‖ for small h; we use h = 10−3
16: x˜← (η/m)δk
17: x˜← PROJECT(d, x˜,x, )
18: end for
19: return x˜
20: end procedure
21:
22: procedure MULTIPLYJACOBIAN(φ(·), x˜, v) . calculates J>Jv; J is the Jacobian of φ at x˜
23: Jv← (φ(x˜+ hv)− φ(x˜))/h . h is a small positive value; we use h = 10−3
24: J>Jv← ∇u
[
φ(x˜+ u)>Jv
]
u=0
25: return J>Jv
26: end procedure
A.2 Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA)
Our second attack, Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA), optimizes a Lagrangian relaxation of the
perceptual attack problem (3):
max
x˜
L(f(x˜), y)− λmax
(
0, ‖φ(x˜)− φ(x)‖2 − 
)
. (13)
To optimize (13), we use a variation of gradient descent over x˜, starting at x with a small amount of
noise added. We perform our modified version of gradient descent for T steps. We use a step size η,
which begins at  and decays exponentially to /10.
At each step, we begin by taking the gradient of (13) with respect to x˜; let ∆ refer to this gradient.
Then, we normalize ∆ to have L2 norm 1, i.e. ∆ˆ = ∆/‖∆‖2. We wish to take a step in the direction
of ∆ˆ of size η in LPIPS distance. If we wanted to take a step of size η in L2 distance, we could
just take the step η∆ˆ. However, taking a step of particular size in LPIPS distance is harder. We
assume that the LPIPS distance is approximately linear in the direction ∆ˆ. We can approximate the
directional derivative of the LPIPS distance in the direction ∆ˆ using finite differences:
d
dα
d(x˜, x˜+ α∆ˆ) ≈ d(x˜, x˜+ h∆)
h
= m.
Here, h is a small positive value, and we assign the approximation of the directional derivative to m.
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Now, we can write the first-order Taylor expansion of the perceptual distance torwards the direction
∆ˆ as follows:
d(x˜, x˜+ α∆ˆ) ≈ d(x˜, x˜) +mα = mα.
we want to take a step of size η. Plugging in and solving, we obtain
η = d(x˜, x˜+ α∆ˆ) ≈ mα
η ≈ mα
η/m ≈ α.
So, the approximate step we should take is (η/m)∆ˆ. We take this step at each of the T iterations of
our modified gradient descent method.
We begin with λ = 10−2. After performing gradient descent, if d(x, x˜) >  (i.e. the adversarial
example is outside the constraint) we increase λ by a factor of 10 and repeat the optimization.
We repeat this entire process five times, meaning we search over λ ∈ {10−2, 10−1, 100, 101, 102}.
Finally, if the resulting adversarial example is still outside the constraint, we project it into the threat
model; see Appendix 4.
Computational complexity LPA’s running time scales with the number of iterations S used to
search for λ as well as the number of gradient descent steps T . φ(x) may be calculated once during
the entire attack, which speeds it up. Then, each step of gradient descent requires 2 forward and 1
backward passes in the self-bounded case, and 3 forward and 2 backward passes in the externally-
bounded case.
The projection at the end of the attack requires n+ 1 forward passes for n iterations of the bisection
method (see Section A.4).
In total, the attack requires 2ST + n + 2 forward passes and ST + n + 2 backward passes in the
self-bounded case, and 3ST + n + 2 forward passes and 2ST + n + 2 backward passes in the
externally-bounded case.
Algorithm 2 Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (LPA)
1: procedure LPA(classifier network f(·), LPIPS distance d(·, ·), input x, label y, bound )
2: λ← 0.01
3: x˜← x+ 0.01 ∗ N (0, 1) . initialize perturbations with random Gaussian noise
4: for i in 1, . . . , S do . we use S = 5 iterations to search for the best value of λ
5: for t in 1, . . . , T do . T is the number of steps
6: ∆← ∇x˜
[L(f(x˜), y)− λmax (0, d(x˜,x)− )] . take the gradient of (5)
7: ∆ˆ = ∆/‖∆‖2 . normalize the gradient
8: η =  ∗ (0.1)t/T . the step size η decays exponentially
9: m← d(x˜, x˜+ h∆ˆ)/h . m ≈ derivative of d(x˜, ·) in the direction of ∆ˆ; h = 0.1
10: x˜← x˜+ (η/m)∆ˆ . take a step of size η in LPIPS distance
11: end for
12: if d(x˜,x) >  then
13: λ← 10λ . increase λ if the attack goes outside the bound
14: end if
15: end for
16: x˜← PROJECT(d, x˜,x, )
17: return x˜
18: end procedure
A.3 Fast Lagrangian Perceptual Attack
We use the Fast Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (Fast-LPA) for Perceptual Adversarial Training (PAT,
see Section 5). Fast-LPA is similar to LPA (Appendix A.2), with two major differences. First,
Fast-LPA does not search over λ values; instead, during the T gradient descent steps, λ is increased
exponentially from 1 to 10. Second, we remove the projection step at the end of the attack. This
means that Fast-LPA may produce adversarial examples outside the threat model. This means that
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Fast-LPA cannot be used for evaluation, but it is fine for training.
Computational complexity Fast-LPA’s running time can be calculated similarly to LPA’s (see
Section A.2), except that S = 1 and there is no projection step. Let T be the number of steps taken
during the attack. Then Fast-LPA requires 2T + 1 forward passes and T + 1 backward passes for the
self-bounded case, and 3T +1 forward passes and 2T +1 backward passes for the externally-bounded
case.
In comparison, PGD with T iterations requires T forward passes and T backward passes. Thus,
Fast-LPA is slightly slower, requiring T + 1 more forward passes and no more backward passes.
Algorithm 3 Fast Lagrangian Perceptual Attack (Fast-LPA)
1: procedure FASTLPA(classifier network f(·), LPIPS distance d(·, ·), input x, label y, bound )
2: x˜← x+ 0.01 ∗ N (0, 1) . initialize perturbations with random Gaussian noise
3: for t in 1, . . . , T do . T is the number of steps
4: λ← 10t/T . λ increases exponentially
5: ∆← ∇x˜
[L(f(x˜), y)− λmax (0, d(x˜,x)− )] . take the gradient of (5)
6: ∆ˆ = ∆/‖∆‖2 . normalize the gradient
7: η =  ∗ (0.1)t/T . the step size η decays exponentially
8: m← d(x˜, x˜+ h∆ˆ)/h . m ≈ derivative of d(x˜, ·) in the direction of ∆ˆ; h = 0.1
9: x˜← x˜+ (η/m)∆ˆ . take a step of size η in LPIPS distance
10: end for
11: return x˜
12: end procedure
A.4 Perceptual Projection
We explored two methods of projecting adversarial examples into the LPIPS thread model. The
method we use throughout the paper is based on the bisection root finding method and is shown in
Algorithm 4. However, we also explored using Newton’s method, shown in Algorithm 5 (also see
Appendix D).
In general, given an adversarial example x˜, original input x, and LPIPS bound , we wish to find a
projection x˜′ of x˜ such that d(x˜′,x) ≤ . Assume for this section that d(x˜,x) > , i.e. the current
adversarial example x˜ is outside the bound. If d(x˜,x) ≤ , then we can just let x˜′ = x˜ and be done.
Bisection method The first projection method we explored (and the one we use throughout the
paper) attempts to find a projection x˜′ along the line connecting the current adversarial example x˜
and original input x. Let δ = x˜−x. Then we can represent our final projection x˜′ as a point between
x and x˜ as
x˜′ = x+ αδ,
for some α ∈ [0, 1]. If α = 0, x˜′ = x; if α = 1, x˜′ = x˜. Now, define a function r : [0, 1]→ R as
r(δ) = d(x+ αδ,x)− .
This function has the following properties:
1. r(0) < 0, since r(0) = d(x,x)−  = −.
2. r(1) > 0, since r(1) = d(x˜,x)−  > 0 because d(x˜,x) > .
3. r(α) = 0 iff d(x˜′,x) = .
We use the bisection root finding method to find a root α∗ of r(·) on the interval [0, 1], which exists
since r(·) is continuous and because of items 1 and 2 above. By item 3, at this root, the projected
adversarial example is within the threat model:
d(x˜′,x) = d(x+ α∗δ,x) = r(α∗) +  = 
We use n = 10 iterations of the bisection method to calculate α∗. This requires n+ 1 forward passes
through the LPIPS network, since φ(x) must be calculated once, and φ(x+ αδ) must be calculated
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n times. See Algorithm 4 for the full projection algorithm.
Algorithm 4 Perceptual Projection (Bisection Method)
procedure PROJECT(LPIPS distance d(·, ·), adversarial example x˜, original input x, bound )
αmin, αmax ← 0, 1
δ ← x˜− x
for i in 1, . . . , n do
α← (αmin + αmax)/2
x˜′ ← x+ αδ
if d(x, x˜′) >  then
αmax ← α
else
αmin ← α
end if
end for
return x˜′
end procedure
Newton’s method The second projection method we explored uses the generalized New-
ton–Raphson method to attempt to find the closest projection x˜′ to the current adversarial example x˜
such that the projection is within the threat model, i.e. d(x˜′,x) ≤ . To find such a projection, we
again define a function r(·) and look for its roots:
r(x˜′) = d(x˜′,x)− .
If we can find a projection x˜′ close to x˜ such that r(x˜′) ≤ 0, then this projection will be contained
within the threat model, since
r(x˜′) ≤ 0⇒ d(x˜′,x) ≤ .
To find such a root, we use the generalized Newton-Raphson method, an iterative algorithm. Begin-
ning with x˜′0 = x˜, we update x˜
′ iteratively using the step
x˜′i+1 = x˜
′
i −
[
∇r(x˜′i)
]+(
r(x˜′i) + s
)
,
where A+ denotes the pseudoinverse of A, and s is a small positive constant (the “overshoot”), which
helps the algorithm converge. We continue this process until r(x˜′t) ≤ 0, at which point the projection
is complete.
This algorithm usually takes 2-3 steps to converge with s = 10−2. Each step requires 1 forward and
1 backward pass to calculate r(x˜′t) and its gradient. The method also requires 1 forward pass at the
beginning to calculate φ(x).
Algorithm 5 Perceptual Projection (Newton’s Method)
procedure PROJECT(LPIPS distance d(·, ·), adversarial example x˜, original input x, bound )
x˜′0
for i in 0, . . . do
r(x˜′i)← d(x˜′i,x)− 
if r(x˜′i) ≤ 0 then
return x˜′i
end if
x˜′i+1 = x˜
′
i −
[
∇r(x˜′i)
]+(
r(x˜′i) + s
)
. s is the “overshoot”; we use s = 10−2
end for
end procedure
B Additional Related Work
Here, we expand on the related work discussed in Section 2 discuss some additional existing work on
adversarial robustness.
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Adversarial attacks Much of the initial work on adversarial robustness focused on perturbations
to natural images which were bounded by the L2 or L∞ distance [23, 5, 6]. However, recently
the community has discovered many other types of perturbations that are imperceptible and can be
optimized to fool a classifier, but are outside Lp threat models. These include spatial perturbations
using flow fields [10], translation and rotation [8], and Wassterstein distance bounds [9]. Attacks that
manipulate the colors in images uniformly also been proposed [11, 41, 42] and have been generalized
into “functional adversarial attacks” by Laidlaw and Feizi [12].
A couple papers have proposed adversarial threat models that do not focus on a simple, manually
defined perturbation type. Dunn et al. [28] use a generative model of images; they perturb the features
at various layers in the generator to create adversarial examples. Xu et al. [29] train an autoencoder
and then perturb images in representation space rather than pixel space.
C Additional Perceptual Study Results
Table 4: Bounds and results from the perceptual study. Each threat model was evaluated with a small,
medium, and large bound. Bounds for UAR attacks (first ten rows) are given assuming input image
is in the range [0, 255]. Perceptibility (perc.) is the proportion of natural input-adversarial example
pairs annotated correctly by participants. Strength (str.) is the success rate when attacking a classifier
adversarially trained against that threat model (higher is stronger). Perceptual attacks (PPGD and
LPA, see Section 4) are externally bounded with AlexNet. A dash( —) indicates that none of the UAR
attack bounds from Kang et al. [18] were imperceptible enough. All experiments on ImageNet-100.
Threat model Small bound Medium bound Large bound
Bound Perc. Str. Bound Perc. Str. Bound Perc. Str.
L∞ 2 57% 18.0% 4 63% 23.1% 8 82% 36.2%
L2 600 54% 19.7% 1200 62% 28.9% 2400 82% 45.3%
L1 9562.5 61% 15.5% 19125 71% 17.2% 76500 80% 24.4%
JPEG-L∞ 0.0625 55% 14.7% 0.125 68% 16.1% 0.25 87% 21.0%
JPEG-L2 8 53% 14.6% 16 63% 16.8% 32 81% 21.8%
JPEG-L1 256 64% 14.7% 1024 76% 17.4% 4096 89% 27.7%
Fog — — 128 85% 13.1%
Gabor — 6.25 71% 15.2% 12.5 89% 15.2%
Snow — — 0.0625 85% 18.4%
Elastic 0.25 62% 14.2% 0.5 68% 15.8% 2 85% 23.8%
StAdv 0.025 56% 23.0% 0.05 67% 23.3% 0.1 79% 26.1%
ReColorAdv 0.03 61% 10.0% 0.06 76% 10.8% 0.12 89% 25.7%
PPGD 0.25 53% 22.3% 0.5 59% 24.5% 1 75% 46.8%
LPA 0.25 63% 39.5% 0.5 71% 85.0% 1 77% 99.4%
D Perceptual Attack Experiments
We experiment with variations of the two validation attacks, PPGD and LPA, described in Section
4. As described in Appendix A.4, we developed two methods for projecting candidate adversarial
examples into the LPIPS ball surrounding a natural input. We attack a single model using PPGD and
LPA with both projection methods. We also compare self-bounded to externally-bounded attacks.
We find that LPA tends to be more powerful than PPGD. Finally, we note that externally-bounded
LPA is extremely powerful, reducing the accuracy of a PAT-trained classifier on ImageNet-100 to
2.0% when using the high bound of  = 1 from Table 4.
Besides these experiments, we always use externally-bounded attacks with AlexNet for evaluation.
AlexNet correlates with human perception of adversarial examples (Figure 4) and provides a standard
measure of LPIPS distance; in contrast, self-bounded attacks by definition have varying bounds
across evaluated models.
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Table 5: Accuracy of a PAT-trained ResNet-50 on ImageNet-100 against various perceptual adversarial
attacks. PPGD and LPA attacks are shown self-bounded and externally-bounded with AlexNet. We
also experimented with two different perceptual projection methods (see Appendix A.4). Bounds are
 = 0.5 for self-bounded attacks and  = 1 for externally-bounded attacks, since the LPIPS distance
from AlexNet tends to be about twice as high as that from ResNet-50.
Attack LPIPS model Projection Accuracy against PAT
PPGD self bisection method 60.8
PPGD self Newton’s method 62.1
PPGD AlexNet bisection method 55.7
PPGD AlexNet Newton’s method 50.5
LPA self bisection method 58.4
LPA self Newton’s method 59.0
LPA AlexNet bisection method 2.0
LPA AlexNet Newton’s method 0.4
E PAT Ablation Study
We perform an ablation study of Perceptual Adversarial Training (PAT). First, we examine Fast-LPA,
the training attack. We attempt training without step size (η) decay and/or without increasing λ
during Fast-LPA, and find that PAT performs best with both η decay and λ increase. Second, we
also compare attacking every input with Fast-LPA during training to only attacking the natural inputs
which are already classified correctly. We find that the latter method achieves higher natural accuracy
at the cost of some robust accuracy.
Table 6: Accuracies against various attacks for models in the PAT ablation study. Attack bounds are
8/255 for L∞, 1 for L2, 0.5 for PPGD/LPA, and the original bounds for StAdv/ReColorAdv.
Attack
Training Ablation None L∞ L2 StAdv ReColorAdv PPGD LPA
PAT 81.9 42.3 47.2 51.7 75.4 26.5 5.8
PAT no η decay 83.2 43.8 48.9 38.9 73.9 28.7 3.0
PAT no λ increase 85.8 38.6 41.2 30.6 72.6 24.7 2.1
PAT no η decay or λ increase 83.7 41.4 46.7 39.6 73.6 26.3 2.0
PAT attack all inputs 72.8 44.0 47.9 60.4 68.3 32.8 6.6
F Experiment Details
For all experiments, we train ResNet-50 [34] with SGD for 100 epochs. We use 10 attack iterations
for training and 200 for testing, except for PPGD and LPA, where we use 40 for testing since they are
more expensive. Self-bounded PAT takes about 12 hours to train for CIFAR-10 on an Nvidia RTX
2080 Ti GPU, and about 5 days to train for ImageNet-100 on 4 GPUs.
We implement PPGD, LPA, and PAT using PyTorch [43]. For Lp adversarially trained models
on CIFAR-10, we use pretrained models from the robustness library [44]. For UAR attack
adversarially trained models on ImageNet-100, we use the pretrained models from Kang et al. [18].
We preprocess images after adversarial perturbation, but before classification, by standardizing them
based on the mean and standard deviation of each channel for all images in the dataset. We use the
default data augmentation techniques from the robustness library [44]. The CIFAR-10 dataset
can be obtained from https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.html. The ImageNet-100
dataset is a subset of the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (2012) [37] including
only every tenth class by WordNet ID order. It can be obtained from http://www.image-net.
org/download-images.
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Table 7: Hyperparameters for the adversarial training experiments on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet-100.
For CIFAR-10, hyperparameters are similar to those used by Zhang et al. [7]. For ImageNet-100,
hyperparameters are similar to those used by Kang et al. [18].
Parameter CIFAR-10 ImageNet-100
Architecture ResNet-50 ResNet-50
Number of parameters 23,520,842 23,712,932
Optimizer SGD SGD
Momentum 0.9 0.9
Weight decay 2× 10−4 10−4
Batch size 50 128
Training epochs 100 90
Initial learning rate 0.1 0.1
Learning rate drop epochs (×0.1 drop) 75, 90 30, 60, 80
Attack iterations (train) 10 10
Attack iterations (test) 200 200
F.1 Untargeted and randomly targeted attacks
On CIFAR-10, all evaluations use untargeted attacks; that is, the attack may perturb an input such
that is classified as any class except the correct one.
On ImageNet-100, we compare against pretrained models from Kang et al. [18]. They perform
training and evaluation using randomly targeted attacks. In these attacks, a target class is randomly
chosen from all incorrect classes for each input. Then, the attack only succeeds if it perturbs the
input such that it is classified as the specific target class. For a fair comparison, in all ImageNet-100
evaluations we use randomly targeted attacks.
F.2 Layers for LPIPS Calculation
Calculating the LPIPS distance using a neural network classifier g(·) requires choosing layers whose
normalized, flattened activations φ(·) should be compared between images. For AlexNet and VGG-
16, we use the same layers to calculate LPIPS distance as do Zhang et al. [22]. For AlexNet [35],
we use the activations after each of the first five ReLU functions. For VGG-16 [36], we use the
activations directly before the five max pooling layers. In ResNet-50, we use the outputs of the
conv2_x, conv3_x, conv4_x, and conv5_x layers, as listed in Table 1 of He et al. [34].
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